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SCHOOL FINANCE ADEQUACY AS 
VERTICAL EQUITY 
Julie K. Underwood* 
In this Article, Dean Underwood explains that school finance cases 
can be divided into three waves of reform. The first wave involved 
efforts to use the Federal Equal Protection Clause to overturn fi-
nancing systems. Litigants in the second wave turned to state equal 
protection and due process clauses. Finally, the third wave involved 
the utilization of education clauses in state constitutions as the 
predominant litigation vehicle. These three waves embody two 
primary approaches to school finance litigation. The first approach 
involves a challenge to the adequacy of a state's funding system 
under either the state or federal equal protection clause, the primary 
focus being equality in spending among districts. The second ap-
proach, which was used in school finance litigation during the third 
wave, is based on the education clauses in state constitutions. The 
argument in such a case is that the legislature has not fulfilled its 
obligation to provide an education. The theme in cases using the state 
education clause is adequacy from the perspective of"vertical equity," 
meaning that different students should be treated differently based 
on their special educational needs. More recent school finance cases 
have concentrated on this second approach and thus have shifted the 
focus from equal resources to an adequate education for all students. 
Dean Underwood concludes, however, that this approach still focuses 
on education inputs rather than on desired educational outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the funding balances among federal, state, and local 
sources have shifted over the last thirty years, 1 few would argue 
that education has become a lower social priority.2 For any 
* Professor and Dean, School of Education, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. B.A. 
1976, DePauw University; J.D. 1979, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; 
Ph.D. 1984, University of Florida. 
1. By the end of the 1950s, the federal share of educational expenditures for the 
nation's elementary and secondary schools was 4.4% and the local share of expenditures 
was 56.5%. By the end of the 1970s, the federal share was 9.8% and the local share was 
43.4%. THOMAS D. SNYDER & CHARLENE M. HOFFMAN, NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUCATION 
STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 50 (1994). 
2. Federal support for education was estimated at $87.6 billion in 1994, an in-
crease of 123% since 1980. After adjustment for inflation, this represents a 22% 
increase during this time. NATIONAL CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR 
EDUCATION 7 tbl. 39 (1994). 
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society, education is the most fundamental investment in the 
future that can be made. As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in 1954: 
[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state 
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws 
and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate 
our recognition of the importance of education to our demo-
cratic society. It is required in the performance of our most 
basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed 
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today 
it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul-
tural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. 
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life ifhe is denied the opportunity 
of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has 
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made 
available to all on equal terms. 3 
In the United States, it is generally accepted that state-
distributed resources must be distributed equally.4 This notion 
holds true unless there is a legitimate rationale to provide 
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). This sentiment was reiter-
ated by the Supreme Court in 1982. 
The "American people have always regarded education and [the) acquisition of 
knowledge as matters of supreme importance." We have recognized "the public 
schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system 
of government," and as the primary vehicle for transmitting "the values on which 
our society rests." ... "[S)ome degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens 
to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to 
preserve freedom and independence." And these historic "perceptions of the public 
schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social 
scientists." In addition, education provides the basic tools by which individuals 
might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education 
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. 
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (citations omitted). 
4. Cf Au.AN R ODDEN & LAWRENCE 0. PICUS, ScHOOL FINANCE: A PoLICY l'ERsPECTivE 
10 (1992) (describing how states in the early 1920s created "[a]id structures [that) 
were designed to distribute larger amounts [of money) to districts with a small 
property tax base per pupil and smaller amounts [of money) to districts with a large 
property tax base per pupil"); id. at 20 (suggesting that "[d)ifferences in educational 
expenditures per pupil across school districts in a state [constituted) the basic school 
finance problem [that was) recognized as early as 1905") (citation omitted). 
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resources unequally.5 In school finance, this concept is often 
referred to as horizontal equity,6 in which every individual is 
treated the same and all students are considered equivalent. 
Equity and fairness should dictate that the state not create 
educational inequities with its own hands-through its school 
finance mechanisms. 
There are three kinds of inequality of educational opportu-
nity: (1) innate, (2) environmental, and (3) state-created. The 
first type of inequality is natural and exists because human 
beings have varying abilities and capabilities. It is an innate 
condition of a child's intelligence, physical strength, disability, 
or giftedness. I believe that correction of deficiencies due to 
this type of inequality is desirable. This is in keeping with the 
widely accepted notion of equity that permits a departure from 
strict equality of revenues per pupil if the departure is based 
on an educational need. Thus, more can be given to those who 
have greater educational needs. 
The second kind of educational inequality is created by social 
and economic conditions that have not been caused directly by 
governmental policy alone, but rather result from individual 
or private-sector decisions acting independently or in connec-
tion with governmental policy. Many times, such conditions 
indirectly influence the education of children, rendering real 
deficiencies in capacity to benefit from educational programs.7 
Environmental inequalities are visited particularly upon 
children in high-poverty areas, such as poor rural areas and 
urban centers, where language deficiencies are great, positive 
parental influence is often minimal, crime is rampant, parental 
income is low, cultural opportunities are lacking, and stabiliz-
ing conditions are at a premium.8 These two forms of inequali-
ty, innate and environmental, bring forth the need for vertical 
equity9-the rationale for treating individuals differently in an 
attempt to mitigate these inequalities. Vertical equity requires 
5. See infra Part I.A. 
6. For a more complete discussion of horizontal equity in school finance, see 
RoBERT BERNE & LEANNA STIEFEL, THE MEAsUREMENT OF EQUITY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: 
CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL, AND EMPffiICAL DIMENSIONS 18-26 (1984). 
7. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text. 
8. See, e.g., notes 138-39 (describing the situation in urban Milwaukee and sur-
rounding suburbs). 
9. For a more detailed discussion of the concept of vertical equity, see BERNE & 
STIEFEL, supra note 6, at 2-3, 35-40. 
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differences in resource allocation based on legitimate differ-
ences between individuals. 10 
The third form of inequality may be caused by the state's 
actions or omissions in its statutory provisions for education 
funding, usually a combination scheme of state and local taxa-
tion. In such cases, the legislature, by combining state and 
local tax revenues, creates revenue inequalities and disparate 
educational opportunities primarily due to differences in local 
fiscal capacity. 
School finance equity litigation traditionally focuses on the 
last of these three types of inequalities-the argument being 
that the state must rectify the inequalities caused by its own 
creation. 11 Educational benefits should not be a function of dis-
trict wealth. Instead, the allocation of state resources should 
be based on a rationale more closely tied to education. In 
addition, differences in educational opportunity created by 
natural and environmental conditions should be mitigated to 
the greatest extent possible to alleviate the debilitating condi-
tions visited upon the least advantaged. 
An additional principle useful to a discussion relating to 
school finance is efficiency or effectiveness, referred to some-
times as accountability standards. Efficiency is an older 
phrase, often defined as a ratio of outputs to inputs: "Efficiency 
is increased by increasing desired outcomes secured from avail-
able resources or by maintaining a given level of outcomes 
while using fewer resources."12 Effectiveness deals with the 
degree to which resources are allocated in ways shown to be 
effective through research: 
The effectiveness principle shifts the perspective to wheth-
er or not resources are deployed in research-proven 
effective ways. The effectiveness principle suggests that a 
resource inequity exists not only when insufficient resourc-
es are available, but when resources are not used in ways 
that produce desired impacts on student performance. 13 
10. See id. 
11. See infra Part I.A-B. 
12. AUSI'IN SWANSON & RICHARD KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS EcoNOMICS AND PoLITICS 
24 (1991). 
13. ODDEN & Plcus, supra note 4, at 52. 
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Consider the following example. The state is mandated by 
statute to provide a coat for every child to keep that child safe 
from the winter's cold. Clearly, if the state gives coats only to 
those children whose parents reside in certain parts of the 
state, its obligation is not met. Additionally, if the state gives 
the same size coat to every child, the statute's purpose is not 
served. Although the state originally fulfills the statute's terms 
on its face, the large child does not have a coat sufficient to 
keep him warm and the small child has a coat too large to suit 
his needs, wasting resources. More specifically, the large 
child's needs are not met adequately and the small child's 
needs are not met efficiently. Only when the state provides a 
coat suitable to each child's needs does the state meet its 
obligation both adequately and efficiently. Thus, the question 
within school finance is whether the state financing structure 
supports the public schools in such a manner as to impose 
educational disadvantage on certain children of the state while 
bestowing unique educational privileges on others. 
I. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
Generally, there are two approaches to litigating school 
finance equity cases. The first theory involves the constitution-
al doctrine of equal protection. 14 As encompassed by either the 
federal or state constitution, this doctrine prohibits the govern-
ment from treating similarly situated individuals differently 
without a strong justification.15 In one variation of this theory, 
litigants argue that the state practice of inequitable funding 
unjustifiably treats students who reside in poorer districts 
differently from those students who reside in more affluent 
districts. 16 The second variation of the equal protection theory 
asserts that the lower funding level in poorer districts results 
in a deprivation of education to students who reside in these 
14. See infra notes 20-40 and accompanying text; Part 1.A-B. 
15. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 14.1, at 523 (3d ed. 1986) 
(stating that "[t)he fourteenth amendment commands that no person shall be denied 
equal protection of the law" and that "[t]he equal protection guarantee ... governs all 
governmental actions") (emphasis added). 
16. See infra Part I.A. 
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districts. 17 Thus, the first variation focuses on differential 
treatment while the second focuses on inadequacy. 
The second type oflitigation theory, based exclusively on the 
education clause in a state constitution, contends that a state 
legislature has failed to live up to its state constitutional obli-
gation to provide an education to the children in its state. 18 
Scholars have divided the school finance cases into three 
separate "waves" of reform. 19 Each wave has its own identifi-
able characteristics and differs in terms of venue and litiga-
tion theory. The first wave starts with the inception of school 
finance equity cases and closes with the 1973 Supreme Court 
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez. 20 These cases focused on the Equal Protection Clause of 
the United States Constitution.21 Initial efforts to use the 
Federal Equal Protection Clause to overturn financing sys-
tems met with little success.22 The failure of these attempts 
led to the development of a legal theory by Coons, Clune, and 
Sugarman.23 They argued that the level of spending for a 
child's education should not be a function of local district 
property wealth.24 This strategy was successfully employed in 
Serrano v. Priest25 in 1971. This case marked the first time 
17. See infra Part l.B. 
18. See infra Part I.C. 
19. See PAULE. BARTON ET AL., POLICY INFO. Om., THE STATE OF INEQUALITY (1991) 
(describing the degrees of inequality in the education system and the movement to 
provide greater equity); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of 
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
597, 598 (1994) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Analysis) (exploring the methodology of 
judicial decision making during the third wave of school finance cases); William E. 
Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on 
the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222 (1990) 
[hereinafter Thro, Third Wave) (analyzing changes in public school finance reform 
litigation that signified the inception of the third wave); Julie K Underwood & 
William E. Sparkman, School Finance Litigation: A New Wave of Reform, 14 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL 'V 517 (1991) (discussing litigation theories used in cases occurring 
during the third wave). 
20. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); see Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 19, 600-01; Thro, 
Third Wave, supra note 19, at 222-251. Cases leading up to Rodriguez included 
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 
(Cal. 1971), and Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd, 394 U.S. 
322 (1969). 
21. The Equal Protection Clause states: "No State shall ... deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
22. See Thro, Judicial Analysis, supra note 19, at 600-03. 
23. See JOHN E. COONS ET AL., PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970). 
24. Id. at 2. 
25. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
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that a state system of school finance was found unconstitu-
tional. 26 In Serrano, the California Supreme Court found that 
the state funding system violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution.27 This case 
spawned debate in the area of school finance, 28 the focus of 
which was achieving equal resources for each child in the 
system. 
This wave was cut short when, in Rodriguez,29 the Supreme 
Court effectively precluded litigants from using the Federal 
Equal Protection Clause as a vehicle for school finance reform. 
The Court ruled that education was not a fundamental right 
because it is not explicitly or implicitly protected by the United 
States Constitution.3° Further, the Court ruled that the Consti-
tution did not prohibit the government from providing different 
services to children in poor school districts than it did to chil-
dren in wealthy school districts. 31 The Court found that, 
although the Equal Protection Clause may protect the rights 
of poor school children, it "does not require absolute equality 
or precisely equal advantages."32 After this decision, a few deci-
sions in state courts followed the Rodriguez analysis and found 
the challenged systems to be constitutional.33 
26. Cf. Eric A Hanushek, A Jaundiced View of "Adequacyn in School Finance 
Reform, 8 EDUC. POL 'y 460, 464 (1994) (describing how "[t)he modern era of school 
finance reform was launched with the landmark Serrano u. Priest ... case in Califor-
nia in the late 1960s"); Thro, Third Waue, supra note 19, at 223-24 (describing how 
the California Supreme Court in Serrano I accepted the "fiscal neutrality" theory, the 
first time that theory was used in a school finance reform case). 
27. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1249-52. 
28. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: A 
LEGISLATORS' HANDBOOK (John J. Callahan & William H. Wilken eds., 1976) (analyzing 
school finance reform efforts since 1971); Joel S. Berke & John J. Callahan, Serrano v. 
Priest: Milestone or Millstone for School Finance, 21 J. PuB. LAW 23 (1972) (discussing 
whether Serrano I and its progeny likely would bring about increased fairness in 
educational finance); W. Norton Grubb & Jack W. Osman, The Causes of School 
Finance Inequalities: Serrano and the Case of California, 5 PuB. FIN. Q. 373 (1977) 
(analyzing Serrano I in the specific context of California in order to determine the 
causes of expenditure inequalities). 
29. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
30. Id. at 33-35. The Court's test for fundamentality was as follows: 
[T)he key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be found in 
comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to 
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as 
important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there 
is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Id. at 33-34. 
31. Id. at 24. 
32. Id. The Court also supplied additional reasons for its decision. See id. 
33. See, e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592-93 (Ariz. 1973); Northshore Sch. 
Dist. No. 417v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 200 (Wash. 1974), overruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. 
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The second wave of cases is marked by greater state inde-
pendence from the United States Supreme Court's precedent 
in Rodriguez. In these cases, with the focus remaining the 
achievement of equal resources for each child in the system, 
state courts employed their respective state constitutional 
provisions of either due process or equal protection. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court may have triggered this wave with its 
second Serrano34 decision, where it found that education was 
a fundamental right under the California Constitution.35 There, 
the court employed strict scrutiny36 to determine that children 
were denied this state constitutional right.37 The highest courts 
of West Virginia38 and Wyoming39 followed this approach.40 
The third and final wave took shape during the last part of 
the 1980s and departed significantly from previous cases. First, 
this wave is marked by a shift away from traditional horizon-
tal equity arguments of the first two waves and toward a 
greater emphasis on student programs and opportunities.41 
This shift may have been due, in part, to the publication of A 
Nation At Risk,42 a report focusing on accountability and 
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71(Wash.1978). BothSlwfstall and Kinnear followed the Rodri-
guez analysis and found the state funding system constitutional. Although rejecting the 
Rodriguez analysis, both Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 646 (Idaho 1975) and 
Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976) upheld the school finance systems as 
constitutional. Thompson, 554 P.2d at 653; Olsen, 537 P.2d at 148-49. 
34. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano In, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 
907 (1977). 
35. Serrano II, 557 P.2d. at 951. 
36. For a discussion of the three levels of review under the Equal Protection Clause, 
see NOWAK ET AL., supra note 15, § 14.3, at 530-33 (3d ed. 1986). 
37. Serrano II, 557 P.2d. at 951-53. 
38. Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 CW. Va. 1979) (holding that education is 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the West Virginia Constitution and that "any 
discriminatory classification found in the educational financing system" would be 
reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard). 
39. Washakie County Sch. Dist. v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 340 (Wyo. 1980) 
(holding that education is a fundamental interest and that the state's school financing 
system was unconstitutional under Wyoming Constitution's equal protection clause), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
40. For examples of state courts that held that education was not a fundamental 
right under the state constitution and that consequently applied rational basis review, 
see Lujon v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982), Hornbeck 
v. Somerset County Board of Education, 458 A2d 758 (Md. 1983), Board of Education, 
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal 
dismissed, Board of Education v. Nyquist, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983), and Board ofEducation 
v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980). 
41. See, e.g., McDuffyv. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 
552 (Mass. 1993). 
42. NATIONAL CoMM'N ON ExCELLENCE IN Enuc., A NATION AT RisK: THE IMPERATIVES 
FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1983). States reacted to this report by strengthening high school 
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efficiency issues that drew national attention away from equal 
allocation of resources and toward achievement and outcomes. 
Second, the third wave differs from the previous two waves in 
that the predominant litigation vehicle used is the education 
clause of state constitutions.43 Finally, a significant change in 
this wave is the consistent success plaintiffs have had in over-
turning state funding systems. Plaintiffs have been successful 
in New Jersey,44 Massachusetts,45 Alabama,46 Tennessee,47 
Missouri,48 Kentucky,49 Texas,50 and Montana.51 But this suc-
cess is not uniform-plaintiffs have been unsuccessful in 
graduation requirements, upgrading curriculum standards and raismg teacher 
certification requirements. POLICY INFo. Orn., EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERV., THE STATE OF 
INEQUALITY 19 (1991). 
43. See, e.g., McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 517-18 (quoting the Massachusetts educational 
clause as it served as the basis for plaintiffs' challenge to that state's educational finance 
system). 
44. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994) (affirming a lower court's 
judgment that New Jersey's Quality Education Act was unconstitutional as the act failed 
to "assure parity of regular education expenditures between the special needs districts 
and the more affluent districts"). 
45. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 516 (holding Commonwealth's school financing 
system unconstitutional as it failed to provide constitutionally adequate educational 
opportunities to both the wealthy and poor students in Massachusetts). 
46. See Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices 
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. (Ala. 1993) (holding Alabama's school finance system 
unconstitutional as it inter alia failed to provide appropriate instruction to children with 
disabilities as required by the state constitution). 
47. See Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993) 
(holding that local control over school administration did not justify state educational 
funding system that produced substantial disparities in educational opportunities for 
students in various districts). 
48. See Committee for Educ. Equalityv. Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, 
Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (concluding that the Missouri school financing system was unconstitu-
tional under that state's constitution because the system created vast disparities in the 
funding of Missouri school districts) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). 
49. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (holding 
that the Kentucky common school system violated the state constitution because the 
system did not operate efficiently). 
50. See Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist., 
826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992) (holding the Texas school financing system unconstitutional 
under the Texas Constitution because the system required levying inappropriate taxes); 
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (concluding that the 
state school financing system violated the Texas constitution by failing to operate 
efficiently), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991). 
51. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989) 
(holding the state educational funding system invalid under the Montana Constitution 
because it failed to provide equality of educational opportunity to all students), amended, 
784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990). 
502 Uniuen;ity of Michigan Journal of Law 'Reform [VOL. 28:3 
overturning the state systems in Kansas,52 Illinois,53 Virginia,54 
North Dakota,55 Minnesota,56 and Wisconsin.57 
A Differential Treatment 
This section examines some cases in which plaintiffs have 
argued that treating students from poor districts differently 
from students from wealthy districts-by spending less money 
per student in poor districts-violates the equal protection 
clause of either the state or federal constitution. In two cases 
involving school finance equity litigation, the Supreme Court 
stated that, under the United States Constitution, the appropri-
ate level of scrutiny is the lowest level, rational basis review. In 
San Antonio Independent School District u. Rodriguez,58 the 
Court held that the state system merely had to bear some 
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose;59 and the 
disparity in funding was upheld as being a result of the state's 
52. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. State, 885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994) (upholding state 
school financing system under the Kansas Constitution where the system was applied 
uniformly throughout the state, even though such application meant that different 
districts received different amounts of money). 
53. See Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. App. 1994) 
(upholding the state education system because there was no showing that the financing 
arrangement created an unconstitutionally inefficient system of education). 
54. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 1994) (upholding Virginia's 
public school financing where the state constitution recognized education as a funda-
mental right, but did not require equal or substantially equal funding among or within 
state school divisions). 
55. See Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 1994) 
(upholding on procedural grounds the North Dakota school financing system, despite 
constitutionally suspect per-pupil spending disparities). 
56. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (upholding Minnesota school 
financing system that contained a constitutionally permissible referendum levy statute, 
that guaranteed the citizens' fundamental right to education, and that involved spending 
disparities throughout the state). 
57. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989) (rejecting a challenge to state 
funding system that failed to provide additional funds to districts with higher concen-
trations of impoverished students). 
58. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In Rodriguez, the Texas system of school finance provided 
that districts received a portion of their budgets from state funds and supplemented 
those funds with an ad valorem tax on property within the district. Id. at 9-10. The 
plaintiffs, Mexican-American parents of children attending school in a property-poor 
district, id. at 4-5, alleged that reliance on the property taxes favored the property. 
wealthy districts over the property-poor districts in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see id. at 19. 
59. Id. at 40. The Supreme Court found that no federal right was implicated, id. 
at 35, and that no suspect class was disadvantaged by the system, id. at 28. 
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interest in preserving local control of education.60 The Court's 
opinion on the applicable equal protection standard did not 
change with its holding inPapasan v. Allain.61 There, the Court 
again found that the rational basis test was the correct stan-
dard. 62 The case was remanded for further factual findings to 
determine whether the disparities were rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.63 
The application of the rational basis test does not, however, 
guarantee that the challenged school financing formula will be 
upheld; funding disparities may constitute an equal protection 
violation when it can be shown that they are not rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest. Nonetheless, it is very 
difficult to prove that a state system is irrational.64 
The question, then, is whether the courts will continue to 
accept the rationales for disparate funding levels as legitimate. 
The Supreme Court has, in the past, been willing to accept local 
control of public education as a legitimate state purpose.65 
Finance systems which permit disparities in funding while 
ensuring a minimum :foundation program also have been seen 
by courts as rationally related to the objective oflocal control.66 
60. See id. at 49-53 (discussing the merits of local control). 
61. 478 U.S. 265 (1986). 
62. Id. at 284. 
63. See id. at 289. The language in Papasan could be interpreted as narrowing the 
ruling in Rodriguez. The Court stated that Rodriguez did not "purport to validate all 
funding variations that might result from a State's public school funding decisions." Id. 
at 287 (emphasis added). The Court, however, was unable to pursue the issue further 
because the district court had dismissed the claims without making the necessary factual 
determination. Id. at 289. 
64. For examples of cases upholding school financing systems under rational basis 
scrutiny, see Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d· 590 (Ariz. 1973); Lujan v. Colorado State 
Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 
(Ga. 1981); Idaho School for Equal Education Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 
1993); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975); Hornbeck v. Somerset County 
Board of Education, 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 
1993); Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 
359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983); Board of Education v. Walter, 
390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair School Finance 
Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Ok. 1987); Reform Education Finance Inequities Today 
v. Cuomo, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991), aff d as modified, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993). But see Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 
1983) (finding a state funding scheme unconstitutional under a rational basis test where 
the financing system bore no rational relationship to the educational needs of the 
individual districts but rather was determined primarily by the tax base of each district). 
65. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
66. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 49-53 (1973); 
cf id. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that local control may be legitimate in 
many cases but that, in the instant case, "it [was] apparent that the State's purported 
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This view, however, is changing. More courts are beginning 
to see the purpose of the funding formula to be the equitable 
provision of education to all children in a state67 and the states' 
highest courts have found specifically that disparities in funding, 
in fact, may impede local control of school districts.68 As stated 
by the Tennessee Supreme Court: 
First, to alter the state financing system to provide greater 
equalization among districts does not in any way dictate that 
local control must be reduced. Second, as pointed out in 
Serrano II, "The notion oflocal control was a 'cruel illusion' 
for the poor districts due to limitations placed upon them by 
the system itself .... Far from being necessary to promote 
local fiscal choice, the present system [of school finance that 
is based on district wealth] actually deprives the less 
wealthy districts of the option."69 Consequently, even without 
deciding whether the right to a public education is funda-
mental, we can find no constitutional basis for the present 
system, as it has no rational bearing on the educational 
needs of the districts. 70 
B. Educational Deprivation 
Equal protection clauses-both state and federal-also have 
been used to challenge state action which unjustifiably infringes 
on an individual's rights.71 Central to the analysis under this 
concern with local control [was] offered primarily as an excuse rather than as a 
justification for interdistrict inequality"); McDaniel, 285 S.E.2d at 156; Board of Educ., 
Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982), appeal dis-
missed, 459 U.S. 1139 (1983). 
67. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices 
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 114-15 (Ala. 1993). 
68. Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at93; Serranov. Priest(Serranom, 557 P.2d929, 948(Cal. 
1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 373 (Conn. 
1977) (finding that the option of local control for "a town which lacks the resources to 
implement the higher quality educational program which it desires and which is 
available to property-richer towns is highly illusory"); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 
1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Tennes-
see Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). 
69. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 948. 
70. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 155 (quoting Dupree, 651 S.W.2d at 93) (emphasis 
omitted). 
71. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
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variation is the question of whether public school education is 
a fundamental right within the framework of constitutional 
rights. If so, under the traditional three-tier analysis of judicial 
review, the appropriate level ofreview would be strict scrutiny,72 
which would require the state to justify its actions in the 
distribution of funds to public schools by showing that such 
distribution was necessary to a compelling state interest.73 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the 
United States Supreme Court held that education was not a 
fundamental right under the Federal Constitution.74 Federal 
law, however, is not controlling where a state court determines 
that state constitutional rights are broader than their federal 
counterparts.75 Because state courts are the best interpreters of 
72. See, e.g., Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 951-52 (holding that, under the California 
constitution, education is a fundamental right that requires application of strict 
scrutiny); cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973) (finding 
that, because education is not a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, strict 
scrutiny is not required). 
73. NOWAK ET. AL, supra note 15, § 14.3, at 530. 
74. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. 
75. See, e.g., Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950-51 (labelling U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent persuasive where Federal Equal Protection Clause provides less protection 
than the analogous provision of the California Constitution); Horton v. Meskill, 376 
A.2d 359, 371 (Conn. 1977) (giving persuasive authority to the U.S. Supreme Court's 
interpretation of the Federal Equal Protection Clause, but "fully recogniz[ing] the 
primary independent vitality of the provisions of [Connecticut's] own constitution"). 
But see Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974), over-
ruled by Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). In Kinnear, the 
court found that the equal protection provisions of the U.S. and Washington Constitu-
tions "have the same significance and are to be construed alike." Id. at 198. Thus, the 
court cited Rodriguez as the "direct and controlling" case in upholding the Washington 
school funding and disbursement statutes. Id. at 200. However, four years later, that 
decision was overruled insofar as it held that education was not a fundamental right. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
Other state courts have rejected Rodriguez because they question the existence of 
fundamental rights altogether. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
stated: 
[W]e have not found helpful the concept of a "fundamental" right. No one has 
successfully defined the term for this purpose. Even the proposition discussed 
in Rodriguez, that a right is "fundamental" ifit is explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed in the Constitution, is immediately vulnerable, for the right to acquire 
and hold property is guaranteed in the Federal and State Constitutions, and 
surely that right is not a likely candidate for such preferred treatment. 
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 282 (N.J.), affirmed as modified, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), enforced, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
913 (1975). The supreme courts of Idaho and Georgia have noted with approval the 
New Jersey Supreme Court's treatment of the issue of fundamental rights. See 
McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 
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their own state constitutional provisions, they are free to delve 
into their history and discern the meaning of state constitutional 
provisions without being bound by issues of comity to federal 
courts.76 
The California Supreme Court felt compelled to treat educa-
tion as a fundamental interest because of the "distinctive and 
priceless function of education in our society''77 rather than due 
to any particular constitutional language. The court observed 
that education: is essential to a free enterprise democracy; is . - . 
universally relevant; continues over a lengthy period of life; 
molds the personality of young people; and is so important that 
the state has made it compulsory.78 The court found that educa-
tion, in important ways, was at least as vital to a citizen as two 
other state constitutional rights-voting and the rights of 
criminal defendants.79 The California court appears to be alone 
in its adoption of this type of analysis to determine funda-
mentality. 80 The ambiguity of the court's language has prompted 
at least one commentator to suggest that the ruling offers "little 
substantive guidance to lower courts."81 
Courts also may determine that, even if education is not a 
fundamental right that requires strict scrutiny, an intermediate-
level scrutiny still should be employed. A determination that, 
although not a fundamental right, a public school education is 
within the tier of individual interests to be afforded some pro-
tection would require the state to show that denial of an educa-
tion was substantially related to some important state interest.82 
P.2d 635, 644 n.38 (Idaho 1975). The use of the Rodriguez analysis thus may have 
little effect on whether state courts find education to be a fundamental right under 
state law. 
76. Cf. Serrano II, 557 P.2d at 950 n.43 (citing Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 
386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970) (declaring that the Alaska Supreme Court has a "duty" to 
explore and develop that state's own constitutional history, provided that the state court 
does not contravene the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of federal 
constitutional provisions)). 
77. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971). 
78. Id. at 1258-59. 
79. See id. at 1257-58. 
80. See William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional 
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1675 (1989) 
(suggesting that the California Supreme Court had adopted a "third" and novel "test 
of fundamentality"). 
81. Id. (criticizing the California test as "open-ended" and as a potential "license 
... [to] trespass, all too freely, on the legislative domain") (citing Adamson v. California, 
332 U.S. 46, 90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting), overruled by, Halloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 
1 (1964)). 
82. For a discussion of the intermediate level of scrutiny, see NOWAK ET AL., supra 
note 15, § 14.3 at 531-33. 
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The state court alternatively could determine that a mid-level 
analysis is applicable even if fundamentality was established. 
In Plyler v. Doe83 the United States Supreme Court considered 
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to apply when children 
are completely denied a public school education. In that case, 
the Court found that, although education is not specifically set 
forth as a federal constitutional right, it ''has a fundamental role 
in maintaining the fabric of our society''84 by preparing citizens 
to participate in a democracy and to lead economically produc-
tive lives. Finding that the state could not demonstrate that a 
substantial interest was furthered by the statute excluding 
children of illegal aliens from the Texas public school system, 
the Court ruled the statute unconstitutional.85 
In a more recent North Dakota case, the state court found 
that a mid-level scrutiny should be applied in a school finance 
setting because it is an "important substantive right."86 The 
court stated: 
Funding of education promotes "[a] high degree of intelli-
gence, patriotism, integrity and morality on the part of every 
voter in a government by the people ... to insure the contin-
uance of that government and the prosperity and happiness 
of the people" ... and is essential to the practical realization 
of the fundamental right enumerated in our state constitu-
tion .... 
Although the statutory method for distributing funding for 
education may not totally deprive any student of access to 
the fundamental right to education, we believe the method 
of distributing funding for that fundamental right involves 
important substantive matters similar to those rights in-
volved in cases in which we have applied the intermediate 
level of scrutiny. Accordingly, we analyze these equal protec-
tion claims under the intermediate level of scrutiny, and we 
require the distribution of funding for education to bear a 
close correspondence to legislative goals. 87 
83. 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). 
84. Id. at 221. 
85. Id. at 230. It is unclear which level of scrutiny the Court adopted, but it 
appeared to be higher than rational basis. See id. at 224 (stating that the statute in 
question could "hardly be considered rational unless it ... further[ed] some substantial 
goal of the State"). 
86. Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994). 
87. Id. at 259 (quoting N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1) (citations omitted). The North 
Dakota Supreme Court upheld the state educational financing system for procedural 
reasons. Id. at 250. 
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Using a variety of analyses, courts in thirteen states have held 
education to be a fundamental right under their state constitu-
tions.88 For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts found that its constitutional provision89 provided to all 
children the right to adequate educational services.90 The 
Massachusetts court based its holding on the terms used within 
the state constitutional provision: 
The duty established is, inter alia, placed on the "legisla-
tures and magistrates, in all future periods of this Common-
wealth." The common meaning of "duty'' in 1780, according 
to a dictionary of the English language published that year, 
was "that to which a man is by any natural or legal obliga-
tion bound." "[l]n the sense most obvious to the common 
intelligence," both then and now, a duty that to which one 
is bound, or an "obligation."91 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Claremont School 
District v. Governor92 found a constitutional duty to provide 
88. See Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices 
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 157 (Ala. 1993); Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. 
v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811 (Ariz. 1994); Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (Ariz. 
1973); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 951 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); 
Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1971); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A2d 359, 
373 (Conn. 1977); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 214 (Ky. 1989); 
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 
N.W.2d at 256; Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 151 (Tenn. 
1993); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Pauley v. Bailey, 255 
S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989); 
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
89. The relevant language of the Massachusetts Constitution is as follows: 
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body 
of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and 
as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in 
the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it 
shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all 
seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and 
grammar schools in the towns .... 
MAss. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2. 
90. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 
(Mass. 1993). 
91. Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted). 
92. 635 A2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). 
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education from co_nstitutional language requiring the legislature 
to "cherish" public schools.93 The Tennessee Supreme Court used 
a logical approach, analyzing the syntax of the constitutional 
provision to determine that education was a constitutional right: 
The declaration that "[k]nowledge, learning, and virtue, [are] 
essential to the preservation of republican institutions," 
contained in the same provision of the constitution that 
created a public school system and provided for its support 
through a common school fund, established the legal right 
to public education in Tennessee.94 
The Missouri court in Committee for Educational Equality v. 
Missouri95 found that the legislature had a constitutional 
obligation to provide an equitable and meaningful education to 
every child of the state. The court reasoned as follows: 
The Constitution of Missouri requires that the State of 
Missouri provide and fund a system of free public schools so 
that every child in Missouri will be afforded substantially 
equal educational opportunities without regard to place of 
residence, wealth or other economic circumstance .... 
A deviation from equality on a per student basis in the 
distribution of the total resources (both state and local) 
among the schools in the Missouri school system should not 
be permitted except to provide resources either (a) to the 
least advantaged or (b) for specially identified educational 
needs.96 
Similarly, legislative involvement in education since the 
framing of the state's constitution convinced the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court that education was a fundamental right.97 
93. Id. at 1377-78. The court found that the Encouragement of Literature Clause 
of the New Hampshire Constitution imposes a duty on the state to provide constitu-
tionally adequate education to every educable child in public schools in the state and 
to guarantee adequate funding because the phrase "shall be the duty ... to cherish" is 
not merely a statement of aspiration; rather, the language commands that the state 
provide education to all its citizens and that it support all public schools. Id. at 1378. 
94. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150 (Tenn. 1993) 
(quoting TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 120). 
95. No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the University 
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Committee for Educ. Equalityv. State, 878 S.W.2d 
446 (Mo. 1994). 
96. Id. at 30. 
97. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis. 1989). 
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Courts during the first and second waves of school finance 
litigation focused their analyses on state and federal equal 
protection claims which involve different levels of judicial 
scrutiny. In the most current, third-wave cases, in which plain-
tiffs have used state constitutional provisions as a vehicle, both 
the federal test for determining a fundamental right98 and for 
when to apply strict scrutiny99 are abandoned. The level of 
scrutiny is sometimes unclear in these cases.100 It appears the 
focus of litigation in this third wave has shifted away from the 
three levels of scrutiny and toward the substance of a state's 
education clause. 
98. See, e.g., Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 811, 815-16 
(Ariz. 1994) (holding that the school financing system did not satisfy the Arizona 
"general and uniform" constitutional mandate, thus leaving undecided the issue of 
whether education is a fundamental right); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. 
Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 732 (Idaho 1993) (rejecting the Rodriguez definition of fundamental 
right and finding that education is not a fundamental right under the Idaho Constitu-
tion); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S. W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (holding that 
the common school system was unconstitutional under the Kentucky Constitution and, 
therefore, not deciding whether education is a fundamental right under the U.S. 
Constitution); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511N.W.2d247, 256 (N.D. 1994) 
(containing an agreement by both parties that education was a fundamental right under 
the North Dakota Constitution); McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (holding the school 
funding scheme was unconstitutional without reaching the question of whether 
·education is a fundamental right under the state constitution); Scott v. Commonwealth, 
443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (finding education to be a fundamental right under the 
Virginia Constitution); Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 568 (rejecting Rodriguez in so far as it held 
that education was a fundamental right but following Rodriguez by applying the rational 
basis standard); Committee for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 641 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Ill. App. 
1994) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court's definition of fundamental right differs 
from the federal definition). 
99. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315-16 (Minn. 1993) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to review educational funding system under the state equal 
protection clause); Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 259 (applying strict 
scrutiny in determining whether the legislature provided a "general and uniform" system 
of education but applying rational basis in reviewing the financing of such a system). 
100. See, e.g., Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-883-R, CV-91-0117-R 
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices 
No. 338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 161 (Ala. 1993) (declaring the Alabama public school 
system unconstitutional under any of the three equal protection standards of review); 
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 156 (declaring the state financing arrangement unconstitu-
tional under rational basis review without enumerating the requirements of that level 
of review); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) 
(striking a school fmancing arrangement without explicitly stating the level of analysis 
used), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991); Committee for Educ. Equality v. 
Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (declaring the Missouri 
school finance scheme unconstitutional without indicating the level of scrutiny employed) 
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
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C. Education Clause 
An education clause is a state constitutional provision con-
taining some statement about the state's role in public educa-
tion. Education clauses vary widely by state. Some states merely 
pronounce the importance of education, while others mandate 
a "system" of free public education. Still others qualify the term 
"system" with such phrases as "thorough and efficient," "uni-
form," or "general and uniform."101 Although some scholars have 
101. See ALA. CONST. art. XIV,§ 256, amended by ALA. CONST. amend. 111 ("a liberal 
system of public schools"); ALAsKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a system of public schools"); Aruz. 
CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a general and uniform public school system"); ARK. CONST. art. XIV, 
§ 1 ("a general, suitable and efficient system of free public schools"); CAL. CONST. art. IX, 
§ 5 ("a system of common schools"); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 ("a thorough and uniform 
system of free public schools"); CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("free public elementary and 
secondary schools"); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("a general and efficient system of free public 
schools"); FLA. CONST. art. IX,§ 1 ("a uniform system of free public schools"); GA. CONST. 
art. VIII,§ 1, 'll l("an adequate public education"); HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("a statewide 
system of public schools"); IDAHO CONST. art. IX,§ 1 ("a general, uniform and thorough 
system of public, free common schools"); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("an efficient system of 
high quality pU:blic educational institutions and services"); IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a 
general and uniform system of Common Schools"); IOWA CONST. art. IX,§ 3 ("encourage, 
by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement"); KAN. CONST. art. VI,§ 1 ("establishing and maintaining public schools"); 
KY. CONST. § 183 ("an efficient system of common schools"); LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a 
public educational system"); ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 ("the Legislature are 
authorized, and it shall be their duty to require, the several towns to make suitable 
provision at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools"); MD. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient System of Free Public Schools"); MAss. 
CONST. pt. II, ch. V, §II ("to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all 
seminaries of them; especially the University at Cambridge, public schools and grammar 
schools in the towns"); MICH. CONST. art. VIII,§ 2 ("a system of free public elementary 
and secondary schools"); MINN. CONST. art. XIII,§ 1 ("a general and uniform system of 
public schools"); MISS. CONST. art. VIII,§ 201 ("establishment, maintenance and support 
of free public schools"); Mo. CONST. art. IX, § l(a) ("establish and maintain free public 
schools for gratuitous instruction"); MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3) ("a basic system of free 
quality public elementary and secondary schools"); NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("free 
instruction in the common schools"); NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2 ("a uniform system of 
common schools"); N.H. CONST. pt. 2 art. 83 ("cherish the interest of literature and the 
sciences, and all seminaries and public schools"); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 'I 1 ("a 
thorough and efficient system of free public schools"); N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("a 
uniform system of free public schools"); N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("a system of free 
common schools"); N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(2) ("a general and uniform system of free 
public schools"); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 ("a uniform system of free public schools"); 
OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("a thorough and efficient system of common schools"); OKLA. 
CONST. art. XIII, § 1 ("a system of free public schools"); OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 ("a 
uniform, and general system of Common schools"); PA. CONST. art. III,§ 14 ("a thorough 
and efficient system of public education"); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("promote public 
schools"); S.C. CONST. art. XI,§ 3 ("a system of free public schools"); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 1 ("a general and uniform system of public schools"); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12 ("a 
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attempted to categorize state education clauses according to 
their language in an attempt to predict the likelihood of success 
for school finance equity cases based on such clauses, 102 such 
exercises are not particularly clear or useful. Education clauses, 
for the most part, defy categorization because they are peculiar 
to the state's constitutional history103 and its judiciary's own 
method of interpretation. 104 State courts have used variously 
worded educational provisions to reach similar results, 105 and 
system of free public schools"); TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("an efficient system of public 
free schools"); UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1 ("establishment and maintenance of the state's 
education systems"); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 68 ("a competent number of schools ought to be 
maintained in each town"); VA. CONST. art. VIII,§ 1 ("a system of free public elementary 
and secondary schools"); WASH. CONST. art. Ix,§ 2 ("a general and uniform system of 
public schools"); W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 ("a thorough and efficient system of free 
schools"); WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 ("the establishment of district schools, which shall be 
as nearly uniform as practicable"); WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1 ("a complete and uniform 
system of public instruction"). 
102. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform 
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 319-26 (1991) (analyzing and arguing for the use 
of education clauses in school finance reform litigation); William E. Thro, The Role of 
Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79 Enuc. L. REP. 
19 (1993) (advocating that courts should examine constitutional history and explicit 
language to interpret state education clauses). 
103. For a discussion of the historical development of education clauses in state 
constitutions, see William E. Sparkman, The Legal Foundations of Public School 
Finance, 35 B.C. L. REV. 569 (1994). 
104. The courts recognize the unique nature of state education clauses. For example, 
the Tennessee Supreme Court observed: 
[T]he decisions of the courts in [other] jurisdictions provide little guidance in 
construing the reach of the education clause of the Tennessee Constitution. This 
is true because the decisions by the courts of other states are necessarily controlled 
in large measure by the particular wording of the constitutional provisions of those 
state charters regarding education and, to a lesser extent, organization and 
funding. 
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 148. New Hampshire, however, is an exception to this general 
rule. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1378 (N.H. 1993) (examining 
the New Hampshire Constitution alongside the Massachusetts Constitution because the 
former was modeled on the latter). 
105. Compare McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 
1993) (holding that the Massachusetts Constitution requires that the Commonwealth 
provide all public school students with an adequate education) with Rose v. Council for 
Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989) (finding that the Kentucky Constitution 
mandates the general assembly to provide an efficient statewide system of common 
schools). The Massachusetts Constitution uses the phrase, the "duty ... to cherish the 
interests of ... public schools." MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. 5, § 2. The Kentucky Constitution 
uses the phrase, an "efficient system of common schools." KY. CONST.§ 183. Courts of 
both states found that the respective education provisions required each state to provide 
equal access to an education which affords the opportunity for a student to develop skills 
necessary to participate meaningfully in society. McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 548; Council 
for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d at 212-13. 
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state courts have used similarly worded educational provisions 
to reach different results. 106 
In school finance cases across the nation, education clauses 
have been used in two ways: (1) by applying the provision to 
determine if the legislature is abiding by its obligation under the 
clause; or (2) by using the provision to define education as a 
right protected by equal protection and due process. In many 
cases, both claims have been made and are basically indistin-
guishable. The latter arguments have been discussed above. 107 
The former argument preserves the more interesting and 
current questions. Here, arguments focus on the question of the 
type and level of support required to be provided under the state 
constitution. Thus, the focus is what would have been efficiency, 
vertical equity, and adequacy. Most importantly, the focus shifts 
from equal expenditures to spending required for students' 
needs. 
II. ADEQUACY AND VERTICAL EQUITY 
A state's obligations under an education clause generally has 
been interpreted as including a substantive component: the 
education that the state provides must be meaningful. 108 The 
focus is on providing an opportunity for students to receive an 
education that will prepare them to participate actively in 
society. This student-oriented focus differs substantially from 
previous cases that concentrated on equal resources being ex-
pended by districts. 109 
In the context of public education, this argument is actually 
very old. Thomas Jefferson, in A Bill for the More General 
106. Compare Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (holding that the 
constitutional requirement of uniformity in education did not require full equalization 
of local referendum levies) with Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 
432 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that the state constitution only guarantees equal access to 
education and not equal educational opportunities), dismissal allcwed and review denied, 
361 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1987). The Minnesota court found that state's educational provision 
to require only an adequate level of education which meets state standards for all 
students, Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 311-12, while the North Carolina court found its 
provision to require equal access to education. Britt, 357 S.E.2d at 436. 
107. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text. 
108. Cf supra note 93 (requiring a state to provide adequate school funding). 
109. See, e.g., Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) 
(finding that districts must have substantially equal access to similar revenues per pupil 
at similar levels of tax effort), mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991). 
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Diffusion of Knowledge, 110 cited the development of citizens' 
minds as the most effectual means of preventing tyranny.111 He 
argued that a democratic government works best when its 
citizens and governmental officers are "rendered by liberal 
education worthy to receive, and able to guard the sacred 
deposit of the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and ... 
they should be called to that charge without regard to wealth, 
birth or other accidental condition or circumstance .... "112 Thus, 
the purpose of education, under this Jeffersonian concept, is to 
prepare society's children to be functioning members of the state 
when they reach the age of majority: able to read, write, work, 
and be active participants in our democratic society. As stated 
in Abbott v. Burke, 113 a constitutionally sufficient education 
under the New Jersey Constitution is "one that will equip all of 
[the] students of the state to perform their roles as citizens and 
competitors in the same society."114 
Courts in Alabama,115 Arizona,116 California,117 Massachu-
setts, 118 Missouri,119 and Texas120 have all found similar embodi-
ments of this Jeffersonian principle in their state's constitutional 
provisions requiring that the state provide meaningful education 
to all of its children in an equitable manner. As stated by a 
110. THOMAS JEFFERSON,ABill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, in THE 
COMPLETE JF;FFERSON 1048 (Saul K Padover ed., 1943). 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. 575 A2d 359 (N.J. 1990). 
114. Id. at 410. 
115. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-833-R, CV-91-Dll 7-R (Ala. 
Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 
338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 151-54 (Ala. 1993). 
116. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 812, 816 (Ariz. 1994). 
117. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-59 (Cal. 1971). 
118. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 535-41 
(Mass. 1993). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that a provision 
of their state constitution was based on this Jeffersonian principle. 
The duty is established so that the rights and liberties of the people will be 
preserved. The immediate purpose of the establishment of the duty is the spread-
ing of the opportunities and advantages of education throughout the people; the 
ultimate end is the preservation ofrights and liberties. Put otherwise, an educated 
people is viewed as essential to the preservation of the entire constitutional plan: 
a free, sovereign, constitutional democratic State. 
Id. at 524. 
119. Committee for Educ. Equality v. Missouri, No. CV190-1371CC (Cole County, 
Mo. Jan. 15, 1993) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). 
120. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 395-96 (Tex. 1989), 
mandamus proceeding, 804 S.W.2d 491 (1991). 
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court in Missouri, "[t]he Constitution of Missouri promotes the 
Jeffersonian concept that education is fundamental to democracy 
and that the state should assume the primary educational 
role."121 
The highest state courts of West Virginia,122 Kentucky,123 
Washington 124 New Jersey 125 Alabama 126 and Tennessee127 have 
' ' ' stressed that public education must meet a certain substantive 
level of educational quality in order to satisfy constitutional 
requirements. 128 For example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
in interpreting that state's constitutional requirement described 
the constitutional mandate to be as follows: 
that the General Assembly shall maintain and support a 
system of free public schools that provides, at least, the 
121. Committee for Educ. Equality, No. CV 190-1371CC, slip op. at 26. The Missouri 
Constitution provides: 
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preserva-
tion of the rights and liberties of the people, the General Assembly shall establish 
and maintain free public schools .... 
Id. (quoting Mo. CONST. art. IX," § l(a)). The court further stated: 
Id. 
By reason of Article IX, Section l(a), the State of Missouri is required to 
maintain a system of free public schools which will provide for that "general 
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence" which is necessary in any given era to 
preserve the "rights and liberties of the people." It is not sufficient that a system 
be only "establish[ed]", it is constitutionally essential, as well, that it be "main-
tain[ed]" at an ever evolving level which will assure the "preservation of the rights 
and liberties of the people. n 
122. Pauley v. Kelley, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979). 
123. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky. 1989). 
124. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 (Wash. 1978). 
125. Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994); Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 
388 (N.J. 1985). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 
368--{i9 (N.J. 1990), found that constitutional language required a "thorough and 
efficient" educational system offering substantive education opportunities that will afford 
each student a chance to become "a citizen and ... a competitor in the labor market." 
Id. (quoting Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J.), affirmed as modified, 306 A.2d 
65 (N.J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), enforced, 351 A.2d 713 (N.J.), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 913 (1975)). 
126. Alabama Coalition for Equity v. Hunt, Nos. CV-90-833-R, CV-91-Dll 7-R (Ala. 
Cir. Ct. Montgomery County filed Apr. 1, 1993), reprinted in Opinion of the Justices No. 
338, 624 So. 2d 107 app. at 110, 165-66 (Ala. 1993). 
127. Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851S.W.2d139, 151-52 (Tenn. 1993) 
(finding that the Tennessee Constitution guarantees children a certain level of education 
but leaving undecided the precise level required). 
128. As stated by Justice Loiselle of Connecticut, "(a] town may not herd children 
in [sic] an open field to hear lectures by illiterates." Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 
379 (Conn. 1977). 
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opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop the pow-
ers of reasoning and judgment, and generally prepare 
students intellectually for a mature life.129 
In New Jersey, the supreme court found that constitutional 
language required a "thorough and efficient" educational sys-
tem 130 offering substantive educational opportunities that will 
afford each student a chance to become "a citizen and . . . a 
competitor in the labor market."131 
The highest courts of Kentucky and Massachusetts went so 
far as to define an adequate system specifically as one in which 
a student has the opportunity to develop at least the seven 
following capabilities: 132 
1. sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable 
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
civilization; 
2. sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political sys-
tems to enable the student to make informed choices; 
3. sufficient understanding of governmental processes to 
enable the student to understand the issues that affect his 
or her community, state, and nation; 
4. sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her 
mental and physical wellness; 
5. sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to 
appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
6. sufficient training or preparation for advanced training 
in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each 
child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and 
7. sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable 
public school students to compete favorably with their 
counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the 
job market. 133 
More recent cases no longer focus on the simple equality of 
per-pupil expenditure. These cases suggest that, as education 
theory has developed, society has become more aware that not 
129. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d at 150-51. 
130. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A2d 359, 368-69 (N.J. 1990). 
131. Id. 
132. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989); see also 
McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993) 
(defining educational adequacy with respect to the seven similar criteria and citing the 
Kentucky Supreme Court in Council for Better Education). 
133. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
SPRING 1995) School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity 517 
all children are equal in terms of their task of learning. They 
have differing abilities and challenges. The system has shifted 
its focus in an attempt to meet the individual needs of children. 
There has been a shift from the paradigm of "one size fits all" 
curriculum to individualized learning in an attempt to accom-
modate the needs of diverse learners. Differences in per-pupil 
expenditures are judged by student needs. As stated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court: "We emphasize that a general and 
uniform school system does not require perfect equality or 
identity. For example, a system that acknowledges special needs 
would not run afoul of the uniformity clause."134 Disparities or 
differences in the educational services provided to a student are 
thus being assessed on the grounds of educational needs as 
opposed to district wealth. 
As early as 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that 
the New Jersey Constitution required an educational system 
which provided economically disadvantaged students with the 
opportunity to compete effectively with students from wealthy 
districts. 135 The court recognized that the needs of students from 
poor districts required the state to spend even more money than 
it spent on students from wealthy districts in an effort to equal-
ize the resources offered to students in the disparate districts. 136 
Children who have greater educational needs should receive 
greater educational services.137 It is not logical that children who 
134. Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 816 (Ariz. 1994). 
135. See Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 390 (N.J. 1985) (comparing "the education 
received by children in property-poor districts to that offered in property-rich districts" 
to ensure that the disadvantaged children can "compete in, and contribute to, the society 
entered by the relatively advantaged children"). 
136. See id. at 388. 
137. Scholars remain divided over whether dollars can rectify inadequate education. 
Compare Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance "Reform" May Not Be Good Policy, 
28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 454 (1991) ("If schools are ineffective at [translating resourc-
es into student achievement], simply heaping more resources on poorly performing 
districts will do little to improve educational equity.") with G. Alfred Hess, Jr., 
METROSTAT, Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance, MONEY MAKES A 
DIFFERENCE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF MIDWESTERN CITY SCHOOL EXPENDITURE~T. 
LoUIS AND CHICAGO 2 (1993) and William T. Hartman, District Spending Disparities: 
What Do Dollars Buy?, 13 J. EDUC. FIN. 436, 458-59 (1988) (concluding that districts 
with more available funds spend them on resources believed to enhance the quality of 
education) and JOHN E. COONS ET AL., supra note 23, at 30 (arguing that cost is related 
to quality). Coons, Clune, and Sugarman have stated: 
We regard the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate testimonial 
to the relevance of money. Whatever it is that money may be thought to contribute 
to the education of children, that commodity is something highly prized by those 
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have fewer educational needs should receive greater educational 
services merely because of the fact that they reside in a district 
with great property wealth. The problem is further compounded 
when one considers that children in need of high-cost programs 
are typically clustered in property-poor districts. 138 These are 
students in need of compensatory education, 139 bilingual pro-
grams, and special education.140 
Arguments for compensatory funding of poor districts often are 
stated in terms of fulfilling the state's constitutional obligation 
or in terms of defining the rationality of educational funding. 
The state has a legitimate interest in providing an adequate and 
equitable education to all of the children of the state. It does not 
have any legitimate interest in depriving them of such an edu-
cation. Courts considering systems in which those with the 
greatest educational needs receive the least money have gener-
ally found such systems to be irrational and insufficient under 
state education clauses. 
It is up to each state court to devise a definition of adequacy 
by which to measure the legislature's efforts in the area of 
Id. 
who enjoy the greatest measure of it. If money is inadequate to improve education, 
the residents of poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be 
disappointed by its failure. 
138. See, e.g., WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BuREAu, AN EvALUATION OF THE CHAPrER 
220 PROGRAM 38 ( 1994) (showing that children in Milwauke~. especially minorities, have 
poorer reading skills than their suburban counterparts). 
139. In the evaluation of the desegregation program for Milwaukee Public Schools 
and the surrounding suburbs, nearly twice as many students were found to be in need 
of compensatory education in property-poor Milwaukee in comparison to the property-
wealthy suburban districts. For example, on the statewide tenth grade reading test, only 
35.5% of Milwaukee students scored above the national 50th percentile compared to 
72. 7% of suburban students scoring above the national 50th percentile. Id. 
140. The situation is compounded by funding considerations. Under the Individual 
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), federal funds 
have never exceeded 12.5% of the national average per pupil expenditure. Thomas B. 
Parrish & Deborah A. Verstegen, The Current Federal Role in Special Education 
Funding, 22 EDUC. CONSIDERATIONS 36, 36 (1994). From 1982 to 1988, the cost of special 
education programs borne by local school districts ranged from 36.1% to 37.8%. U.S. 
DEPT OF EDUC., To Assum: THE FREE AND APPRoPRTATE PuBLIC EDUCATION OF AIL CHILDREN 
WTIH DlsABILmES: FoURl'EEN'IH ANNuAL REl'oRI' 'IO CoNGRESS ON 'lHE IMPIEMENrATION OF 'lHE 
INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 146 (1992). The financial impact of this 
funding imbalance is troublesome, particularly for poor districts, due to cost and 
incidence rate. For example, in Wisconsin, the incidence of special education students 
is significantly higher in the 20 poorest school districts in terms of property wealth as 
compared to the 20 wealthiest districts. Julie K. Underwood et al., Feasibility Study for 
the Association for Equity in Funding: Wisconsin School Finance Equity Final Report 
(Aug. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal 
of Law Reform). 
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education. The trend is to find that the constitutional provision 
requires, at a minimum, a meaningful education which provides 
each student with the opportunity to develop and become a 
productive citizen. The language of state constitutions indicates 
that to fulfill the purpose of the constitutional mandate, stu-
dents should have an opportunity within the puolic school 
system to develop the skills necessary to become meaningful 
contributors to our economy and democratic process. 
This approach still does not address the problem that these 
remedies and theories still focus on educational inputs rather 
than on desired educational outcomes. However, this trend too 
may be changing.141 In the area of school desegregation, recent 
cases involving the question of achieving unitary status have 
inquired into actual student performance as a criterion rather 
than the mere percentage of minority members in the population 
of students and teachers.142 It has been argued that certain 
types of judicial remedies .in the area of desegregation have 
effected actual school reform because they have altered the 
political power groups involved.143 This outcome theory may lay 
the seeds of the fourth wave of school finance reform litigation. 
141. For a related discussion, see John Dayton, Correlating Expenditures and 
Educational Opportunity in School Funding Litigation: The Judicial Perspective, 19 J. 
EDUC. FIN. 167, 171-82 (1993). . 
142. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 38 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 1994). 
143. See, e.g., Jomills H. Braddock II et al., A Long-Term View of School Desegrega-
tion: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 259 (1984) 
(arguing that school desegregation results in societal desegregation); James S. Liebman, 
Desegregating Politics: "All-Out» School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 
(1990) (arguing that school desegregation will solve the problem of systemic racism in 
the United States). 

